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BERKOVITZ V. UNITED STATES: HAS A PHOENIX
ARISEN FROM THE ASHES OF VARIG?
THOMAS H. (SPEEDY) RICE*
INTRODUCTION
N ITS 1984 term the United States Supreme Court
handed down the long-awaited decision of United States
v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig Airlines)
(hereinafter referred to as "Vang").' The Varig opinion
used broad and sweeping language to discuss the discre-
tionary function exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act
(FTCA)2 as it applied to the Federal Aviation Administra-
tion's (FAA) regulatory conduct. As a result of that deci-
sion, attorneys for the government espoused, and many
courts adopted, the opinion that the government was no
longer liable for any negligence arising out of a regulatory
agency's conduct. Some circuits, however, did not adopt
* Associate - Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps, San Diego, California; B.A.,
Sociology, Furman University, 1976; J.D., California Western School of Law,
Summa Cum Laude, 1986.
1 467 U.S. 797, rev'g 692 F.2d 1205 (9th Cir. 1982) and 692 F.2d 1209 (9th Cir.
1982), reh'g denied, 468 U.S. 1226 (1984). The Supreme Court consolidated the
Ninth Circuit decisions of S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig Airlines)
v. United States, 692 F.2d 1205 (9th Cir. 1982) and United Scottish Ins. Co. v. United
States, 692 F.2d 1209 (9th Cir. 1982).
2 The FTCA is a series of acts passed by Congress to permit the government to
be sued under certain circumstances. The acts include 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291,
1346(b)-(c), 1402, 1504 (repealed in 1982), 2110, 2401(b) 2402, 2411, 2412(c)
and 2671-80 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) [hereinafter collectively referred to as
FTCA].
I The government's reliance is based primarily upon the language in Varig that
"whatever else the discretionary function exception may include, it plainly was
intended to encompass the discretionary acts of the Government acting in its role
as a regulator of the conduct of private individuals." Varig, 467 U.S. at 813-14; see
also Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of Am. v. United States, 742 F.2d. 502, 504-05 (9th
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the government's analysis of Varig and attempted to dis-
tinguish what they considered to be "non-discretionary"
conduct.4
The government lawyers' position of complete immu-
nity for regulatory activities, and the contrary position by
the plaintiff's bar that only discretionary decisions were
immune naturally resulted in conflicting decisions among
the United States Courts of Appeal.5 The split among the
courts was more evident in the polio vaccination cases
which resulted in the Supreme Court granting certiorari
in Berkovitz v. United States.6  Prior to discussing the
Berkovitz decision a review of the FTCA and the major
Supreme Court decisions preceding Berkovitz is necessary.
THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT AND THE DISCRETIONARY
FUNCTION EXCEPTION
Congress enacted the FTCA7 as a limited waiver of the
United States' sovereign immunity from legal actions for
certain types of specified torts committed by federal agen-
Cir. 1984) (citing Varig, the court held that the alleged failure of the FAA discover
defects while inspecting an aircraft modification facility was within the exception
because it represented government regulation of private activities).
I See Hylin v. United States, 755 F.2d 551, 553 (7th Cir. 1985) (interpreting
Varig as holding that the discretionary function exception bars tort claims against
the government when agencies require their employees to exercise discretion in
performing enforcement and inspection activities); National Carrier, Inc. v.
United States, 755 F.2d 675, 678 (8th Cir. 1985) (distinguishing "discretionary
judgments concerning agency policy and non-discretionary responsibilities to
carry out federal regulations" and holding that the failure to condemn or identify
contaminated beef cannot be considered a protected discretionary act even
though conducted by a regulatory agency); Leone v. United States, 690 F. Supp.
1182, 1188 (E.D.N.Y. 1988) (failure of FAA medical examiners to apply clearly
articulated medical standards did not involve policy decisions, therefore the dis-
cretionary function exception did not apply). But see Collins v. United States, 783
F.2d 1225, 1229 n.3 (5th Cir. 1986) (specifically disagreeing with Hylin).
See supra notes 3 - 4 and accompanying text.
108 S. Ct. 1954, cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 692 (1988). The Court granted certio-
rari to resolve conflicts among the lower courts regarding the effect of the discre-
tionary function exception on claims arising from the government's regulation of
polio vaccines. Id. at 1958. Compare Berkovitz v. United States, 822 F.2d 1322 (3d
Cir. 1987), rev'd, 108 S. Ct. 1954 (1988) with Baker v. United States, 817 F.2d 560
(9th Cir. 1987) and Loge v. United States, 622 F.2d 1268 (8th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 456 U.S. 944 (1982).
7 FTCA, supra note 2.
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cies through its employees.8 An individual asserting a
claim against the United States for the negligent acts or
omissions of government employees must follow the pro-
cedural requirements as outlined in the FTCA.9 For ex-
ample, the FTCA first requires exhaustion of the
administrative remedies within the allegedly negligent
federal agency. 10 A lawsuit may be instituted when the
government fails to settle the plaintiff's claim and a dis-
trict court may award damages against the United States
only when a private individual could be held liable in like
circumstances under the relevant state law." Congress,
however, excluded certain claims from the act's cover-
age' 2 when it enacted the FTCA out of concern that these
See Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 17, reh'g denied, 347 U.S. 924 (1954).
See generally 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-80 (1982).
28 U.S.C. § 2675 (1982); see Genson v. Ripley, 681 F.2d. 1240, 1241 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 937 (1982) (declining case where plaintiff failed to file
administrative claims against the Smithsonian Institute); Three-M Enter., Inc. v.
United States, 548 F.2d 293, 294 (10th Cir. 1977) (holding that notice to quit the
United States Postal Service did not represent filing of an administrative claim);
Claremont Aircraft, Inc. v. United States, 420 F.2d 896, 897 (9th Cir. 1970) (suit
barred because claimant failed to file suit within six months after Air Force denied
claim).
" 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1982); see Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 2, 5-12
(1962) (applying state laws when negligence occurred); Indian Towing Co. v.
United States, 350 U.S. 61, 63-65 (1955) (recognizing that the FTCA does not
exclude governmental activities simply because a private individual does not pro-
vide similar functions).
21 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (1982) generally excludes the following:
(a) Any claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of the
Government, exercising due care, in the execution of a statute or
regulation, whether or not such statute or regulation be valid, or
based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or
perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal
agency or an employee of the Government, whether or not the dis-
cretion involved be abused.
(b) Any claim arising out of the loss, miscarriage, or negligent trans-
mission of letters or postal matter.
(c) Any claim arising in respect of the assessment or collection of
any tax or customs duty, or the detention of any goods or merchan-
dise by any officer of customs or excise or any other law-enforce-
ment officer.
(d) Any claim for which a remedy is provided by sections 741-752,
781-790 of Title 46, relating to claims or suits in admiralty against
the United States.
(e) Any claim arising out of an act or omission of any employee of
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claims would inhibit certain functions of the
government. 13
The discretionary function exception1 4 exempts discre-
tionary functions or duties on the part of federal agencies
or governmental employees from the FTCA.15 Congress,
however, never defined or expressed within the FTCA
the Government in administering the provisions of sections 1-31 of
Title 50, Appendix.
(f) Any claim for damages caused by the imposition or establish-
ment of a quarantine by the United States.
(g) Repealed. Sept. 26, 1950, ch. 1049, § 13(5), 64 Stat. 1043.
(h) Any claim arising out of assault, battery, false imprisonment,
false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander,
misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract rights: Pro-
vided, That, with regard to acts or omissions of investigative or law
enforcement officers of the United States Government, the provi-
sions of this chapter and section 1346(b) of this title shall apply to
any claim arising, on or after the date of the enactment of this pro-
viso, out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, abuse
of process, or malicious prosecution. For the purpose of this sub-
section, "investigative or law enforcement officer" means any officer
of the United States who is empowered by law to execute searches,
to seize evidence, or to make arrests for violations of Federal law.
(i) Any claim for damages caused by the fiscal operations of the
Treasury or by the regulation of the monetary system.
(j) Any claim arising out of the combatant activities of the military or
naval forces, or the Coast Guard, during time of war.
(k) Any claim arising in a foreign country.
(1) Any claim arising from the activities of the Tennessee Valley
Authority.
(m) Any claim arising from the activities of the Panama Canal
Company.
(n) Any claim arising from the activities of a Federal land bank, a
Federal intermediate credit bank, or a bank for cooperatives. (June
25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 984;July 16, 1949, ch. 340, 63 Stat. 444;
Sept. 26, 1950, ch. 1049, §§ 2(a)(2), 64 Stat. 1038, 1043; Aug. 18,
1959, Pub. L. 86-168, title II, § 202(b), 73 Stat. 389; Mar. 16, 1974,
Pub. L. 93-253, § 2, 88 Stat. 50.
Id.
' Dalehite, 346 U.S. at 27-30. The Court stated that while Congress desired to
waive government immunity for some of its employees' tortious acts, "it was not
contemplated that the Government should be subject to liability arising from acts
of a governmental nature or function." Id. at 28.
,4 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a)(1982).
'. Id. Section 2680 provides that the FTCA shall not apply to "any claim based
upon . . . the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a
discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of
the government, whether or not the discretion involved be abused." Id.
DISCRETION AND THE FTCA
what constitutes a discretionary function.' 6 A review of
the legislative history of the FTCA reveals only one para-
graph relating to Congress' intent in including the discre-
tionary function exception within the enumerated
exceptions to the FTCA.17 Congress' intent was to insu-
late legislative and regulatory decisions from review by
the judiciary through tort damages suits. 8 The legislative
history indicates strongly, however, that the common law
torts of all federal employees should be subject to a tort
claim under the FTCA.19
PRE-BERKOVITZ DECISIONS By THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT INVOLVING THE DISCRETIONARY
FUNCTION EXCEPTION
Prior to Berkovitz there were three leading Supreme
Court cases interpreting the discretionary function excep-
tion, Dalehite v. United States,2° Indian Towing Co. v. United
States, ' and United States v. Varig.2 In addition, there was
one court of appeals decision summarily affirmed by the
Supreme Court.23
Dalehite v. United States
In Dalehite, the government developed and imple-
mented a plan to produce fertilizer for shipment to war-
ravaged Europe and the Orient. 4 The fertilizer was being
stored in large quantities in Texas City, Texas for loading
on various cargo ships.25 While one of the cargo ships was
still at dockside, the fertilizer caught fire and the ship ex-
-, See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-80 (1982).
,7 H.R. REP. No. 1287, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 5-6 (1945).
, Id.; see also Dalehite, 346 U.S. at 33.
H.R. REP. No. 1287, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 5-6 (1945); see also Dalehite, 346
U.S. at 24-35.
2 346 U.S. at 15.
2 350 U.S. at 61.
22 467 U.S. at 797.
2 Eastern Airlines v. Union Trust Co., 221 F.2d 62 (D.C. Cir.), aff'd sub nom.
United States v. Union Trust Co., 350 U.S. 907 (1955).
24 Dalehite, 346 U.S. at 19-22.
25 Id. at 22.
19891
762 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE [54
ploded. 26 The explosion and fire leveled most of the city
and killed numerous people.27 As a result, the plaintiffs
brought a negligence action against the United States for
the damages caused thereby.28
The plaintiffs alleged that the government shipped, or
permitted to be shipped, into a populated area, without
adequate investigation or warnings, a highly explosive fer-
tilizer. 29 The plaintiffs also alleged that government em-
ployees were negligent in the labeling, handling and
loading of the fertilizer for transit.3 0 The Supreme Court
reviewed the FTCA's legislative history 3' and held that
the United States was not liable for damages as a result of
any negligence in connection with the fertilizer
program.32
In perhaps the most quoted language from the opinion,
the Court commented: "[w]here there is room for policy
judgment and decision there is discretion. It necessarily
follows that acts of subordinates in carrying out the oper-
ations of government in accordance with official direc-
tions cannot be actionable. '3 3 The court implied that the
test to decide whether a government act is culpable de-
pends on whether the decision made was at the planning
level or at the operational level. 4 Additionally, the Court
stated that the decisions held culpable in Dalehite were all
reasonably made at the planning level, and, therefore, not
actionable. 5 If, on the other hand, the decisions were
26 Id. at 23.
27 Id.
28 Id. Since the plaintiffs could not show any individual acts of negligence, the
suit alleged that the government was liable for participation in the manufacture
and transportation of the defective fertilizer. Id.
290 Id.
-- Id. at 23-24. The plaintiffs alleged that "the Federal Government had
brought liability on itself for the catastrophe by using a material in fertilizer which
had been used as an ingredient of explosives for so long that industry knowledge
gave notice ... that material might explode." Id.
- Id. at 24-31.
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made at the operational level, they would have been actiona-
ble under the FTCA.36
The difficulty in applying a test to determine what was a
planning-level decision and what was an operational-level
decision was apparent within the majority and dissenting
opinions of Dalehite.37 The majority held that no liability
existed for the entire operation, including the negligent
mislabeling of the bags of fertilizer.38 Justice Jackson, in
dissent, agreed with the planning-level/operational-level
test.3 9 In applying the test, however, he determined that
only the initial decision to implement the fertilizer pro-
gram should have been considered a discretionary func-
tion, and not the negligent acts of those responsible for
carrying out the details. 0
Indian Towing Co. v. United States
Less than three years after Dalehite, the Supreme Court
decided Indian Towing Co. v. United States.4 ' In that case,
the plaintiff suffered economic losses when his tugboat
and barge ran aground, resulting in the destruction of the
cargo on board.42 The vessel ran aground because the
lighthouse was not working and the Coast Guard did not
issue any warning.4 3 The government conceded that the
Coast Guard's failure to properly maintain the lighthouse
or to warn seaman of its inoperation was the cause of the
.- Id. The Court stated that: "In short, the alleged 'negligence' does not sub-
ject the Government to liability. The decisions held culpable [by the trial court]
were all responsibly made at a planning rather than operational level and involved
considerations more or less important to the practicability of the Government's
fertilizer program." Id.
47 Id. at 36-42, 47-60.
Id. at 41.
I1 ld. at 58.
Id. The dissent argued that, "[wie cannot agree that all the way down the
line there is immunity for every balancing of care against cost, of safety against
production, of warning against silence." Id.
4 350 U.S. 61 (1955).
42 Id. at 62.
44 Id.
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accident.44
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine the
extent of the government's liability under the FTCA.45
The relevant provisions of the FTCA that the Court re-
viewed were: (1)section 1346(b), which provides that the
liability of the United States is in accordance with the laws
of the place where the act or omission occurred; 46 (2) sec-
tion 2674, which states that the United States shall be lia-
ble in the same manner and extent as a private individual
under like circumstances; 47 and (3) section 2680(a), the
discretionary function exception.4 8
In Indian Towing, the government sought to avoid any
analysis of the discretionary function exception by admit-
ting that the lighthouse maintenance and warnings were
at the "operational level". 49 Instead, the government ar-
gued that the operation of the lighthouse was a uniquely
governmental function. 50 Therefore, under section 2674,
the government could not be held liable in the same man-
ner as a private individual. 5'
Despite the government's concession the Supreme
Court undertook an analysis of the discretionary function
exception.52 In discussing the scope of the exception the
Supreme Court noted that:
The Coast Guard need not undertake the lighthouse ser-
4 Id. at 62-63, 70. The government did not admit responsibility, but did not
deny the allegations in their response. Id.
4- d. at 63. The Court stated: "Because the case presented an important aspect
of the still undetermined extent of the Government's liability under the [FTCA],
we granted certiorari." Id.
ld.; 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1982).
47 Indian Towing, 350 U.S. at 63; 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1982).
48 Indian Towing, 350 U.S. at 63-64; 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1982); see supra note 15
and accompanying text for the text of section 2680(a).
41, 350 U.S. at 64. The opinion notes that "[t]he Government does not deny
that the [FTCA] does provide for liability in some situations on the 'operational
level' of its activity." Id.
do d
Id. The government's position was that "the language of § 2674 . . . impos-
ing liability 'in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual
under like circumstance' must be read as excluding liability in the performance of
activities which private persons do not perform." Id.
52 Id. at 64-69.
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vice. But once it exercised its discretion to operate a light
on Chandeleur Island and engendered reliance on the gui-
dance afforded by the light, it was obligated to use due
care to make certain that the light was kept in good work-
ing order... or give warning that it was not functioning. 53
Furthermore, contrary to the broad analysis of Dalehite,
the Court stated that where the Coast Guard failed in its
execution of its duty and caused damage to the petition-
ers, the United States would be liable for such damages.54
The Court commented that the FTCA was designed to
compensate the victims of negligence and hold the gov-
ernment liable for negligently performed activities in the
same manner as a private individual. 5
Dalehite and Indian Towing remained the leading
Supreme Court cases interpreting the discretionary func-
tion exception for nearly 30 years. During that time the
federal courts struggled with understanding and applying
the distinction between a "planning-level" decision and
an "operation-level" decision, especially with regard to
FAA regulatory activities.56
" Id. at 69.
54 Id. The Court stated: "If the Coast Guard failed in its duty and damage was
thereby caused to petitioners, the United States is liable under the [FTCA]." Id.
.. Id. at 68. The Court stated that the "broad and just purpose which the stat-
ute was designed to effect was to compensate the victims of negligence in the
conduct of governmental activities and circumstances like unto those in which a
private person would be liable." Id.
m; See, e.g., Gibbs v. United States, 251 F. Supp. 391 (E.D. Tenn. 1965). The
court stated: "Having decided to enter the broad field of the regulation of the
flight and repair and modifications of aircraft and licensing of pilots, the Govern-
ment becomes responsible for the care with which those activities are conducted."
Id. at 400. The case was dismissed against the United States for lack of proximate
cause. See also In re Air Crash Disaster Near Silver Plume, Colo. on Oct. 2, 1980,
445 F. Supp. 384, 405-09 (D. Kan. 1977) (the court, in a lengthy discussion of the
FTCA, stated that where an employee of the FAA fails to perform an "operational
duty" such as the required inspection of seat belts, the government can be held
liable for the injuries that result from this negligence; however, the court found a
lack of proximate cause); Rapp v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 264 F. Supp. 673 (E.D.
Pa. 1967), vacated without opinion, 521 F.2d 1399 (3d Cir. 1975) (holding that a
cause of action existed against FAA for negligent inspection and certification). But
see Colorado Flying Academy, Inc. v. United States, 724 F.2d 871 (10th Cir. 1984)
(decisions of FAA employee in designing Denver terminal control area were cov-
ered by the discretionary function exception), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1182 (1986);
George v. United States, 703 F.2d 90 (4th Cir. 1983) (failure of FAA to promul-
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United States v. Varig
In Varig, the United States Supreme Court held that the
liability for the negligence of the FAA in certifying aircraft
for use in commercial aviation was barred by the discre-
tionary function exception of the FTCA.57 Former Chief
Justice Burger, writing the opinion for a unanimous
Court, first reviewed the brief legislative history and the
confusing judicial interpretations of the discretionary
function exception. 58 Admitting that the Supreme Court's
reading of the FTCA had not always followed a straight
line, the Court resurrected Dalehite and its almost blanket
application of the discretionary function exception.5 9
While the Court did not mention or repudiate the plan-
ning-level/operational-level test, the Court distinguished
previous cases holding the government liable under the
FTCA.60 The Court distinguished the Indian Towing case,
which had been used as a guide in interpreting the plan-
ning-level/operational-level test, as not involving the dis-
cretionary function exception in view of the government's
concession that it involved operational level activity. 6'
The Court enunciated several factors in the determina-
tion of whether the acts of government employees are
protected by the discretionary exception:
First, it is the nature of the conduct, rather than the status
of the actor, that governs whether the discretionary func-
tion exception applies in a given case .... Thus, the basic
gate regulations banning the use of coterminous, dissimilar metals within the fuel
lines was within discretionary function exception); Garbarino v. United States,
666 F.2d 1061 (6th Cir. 1981) (failure to enact stricter safety standards was a plan-
ning level activity covered by the discretionary function exception); Takacs v.
Jump Shack, Inc., 546 F. Supp. 76 (N.D. Ohio 1982) (negligent inspection and
certification by FAA of parachute packing barred by discretionary function
exception).
-57 467 U.S. 797, 798 (1984).
.- d. at 807-14.
- Id. at 811-12.
- Id. at 812-13. The Court distinguished Indian Towing, 350 U.S. at 61 and
Eastern Airlines, 221 F.2d at 62.
- Varig, 467 U.S. at 812. The Court stated: "Significantly, the government
conceded that the discretionary function exception was not implicated in Indian Tow-
ing .... Id.
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inquiry . . . is whether the challenged acts of a Govern-
ment employee - whatever his or her rank - are of the
nature and quality that Congress intended to shield from
tort liability. Second, whatever else the discretionary func-
tion exception may include, it plainly was intended to en-
compass the discretionary acts of the Government acting
in its role as a regulator of the conduct of private
individuals .62
The Court's primary consideration was whether the dis-
cretionary function exception immunized the FAA certifi-
cation process involved in this case from tort liability.63
The respondents' claim was that the FAA was negligent
for failing to inspect the aircraft design process before al-
lowing certification. 64 The government viewed the FAA
as a regulatory agency whose function was to monitor the
compliance of private individuals with FAA regulations.65
The government argued that this regulatory activity is
designed to encourage compliance with minimum safety
requirements and, as such, is the sort of conduct pro-
tected by the discretionary function exception. 66 After re-
viewing the technical and administrative requirements of
aircraft type certification, the Court held that the FAA's
compliance review was the type of activity protected by
the discretionary function exception.6 7
According to the Court, the respondents' argument
that the FAA was negligent in failing to inspect certain el-
ements of the aircraft design, challenged two aspects of
62 Id. at 813-14.
, s Id. at 814.
Id. at 814-15. The Court summarized the respondents' argument as follows:
"[T]he negligent failure of the FAA to inspect certain aspects of aircraft type de-
sign in the process of certification gives rise to a cause of action against the United
States under the Act." Id. at 815.
, Id. The Court stated that the government's view of the FAA was that its func-
tion was "merely to police the conduct of private individuals by monitoring their
compliance with FAA regulations." Id.
-~ Id.
- Id. at 819. The Court stated that the "FAA's implementation of a [spot-
check] mechanism for compliance review is plainly discretionary activity of the
'nature and quality' protected by [the discretionary function exeception]." Id.
7671989]
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the certification procedure.68 The first aspect challenged
the decision by the FAA to implement a spot-check for
reviewing an aircraft manufacturer's compliance with FAA
regulations. 69 The second aspect challenged the applica-
tion of the spot-check inspection to the particular aircraft
in Varig and United Scottish.70 The Court viewed the imple-
mentation of a "spot-checking" program to ensure manu-
facturers' compliance with safety standards as the best
way to accomplish the goal of safe air transportation and
to deal with the realities of limited FAA personnel and re-
sources. 71 The Court emphasized that protection of regu-
latory activities was the underlying reason for the
enactment of the discretionary function exception of the
FTCA.72 The Court stated that Congress intended to pre-
clude the judiciary from second-guessing legislative and
administrative decision making. 73
In the Court's opinion, both claims were barred by the
discretionary function exception of the FTCA because
agency determination of private individual's safety is a
discretionary function of the agency's authority.74 Fur-
ther, the Court noted that the "spot-check" program
called for the FAA, pursuant to specific authority, to take
risks in order to advance the government's purpose.75
Because the FAA acted under authority and in advance-
ment of a governmental purpose, the negligence of the
agency falls squarely within the discretionary function ex-




7 Id. at 820.
72 Id. at 814.
7 Id. The Court stated: "Congress wished to prevent judicial 'second-guessing'
of legislative and administrative decisions grounded in social, economic, and
political policy through the medium of an action in tort." Id.; see also Dalehile, 346
U.S. at 27.
7 Varig, 467 U.S. at 819-20. The Court held that "[w]hen an agency deter-
mines the extent to which it will supervise the safety procedures of private individ-
uals, it is exercising discretionary regulatory authority of the most basic kind." Id.
7. Id. at 820.
76 Id. at 820. The Court noted:
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FAA employees under the spot-check program were pro-
tected by the discretionary function exception." In its
summary, the Supreme Court held that the action against
the FAA was barred by the discretionary function
exception.78
Eastern Airlines v. Union Trust Co.
The last case worth mentioning was the Supreme
Court's summary affirmance of Eastern Airlines v. Union
Trust Co. 79 While the Supreme Court did not issue an
opinion, the Court's summary affirmance of the lower
court decision is a decision on the merits, and binding
upon the lower courts. 8°
The Eastern Airlines case arose out of a mid-air collision
between a Bolivian P-38 and an Eastern Airlines DC-4
while both aircraft were on final approach to land at Na-
In administering the "spot-check" program, these FAA engineers
and inspectors necessarily took certain calculated risks, but those
risks were encountered for the advancement of a governmental pur-
pose and pursuant to the specific grant of authority in the regula-
tions and operating manuals. Under such circumstances, the FAA's
alleged negligence in failing to check certain specific items in the
course of certificating a particular aircraft falls squarely within the
discretionary function exception of § 2680(a).
ld.
77 Id. The Court held that "the acts of FAA employees in executing the 'spot-
check' program in accordance with agency directives are protected by the discre-
tionary function exception as well." Id.
78 Id. at 821.
In rendering the United States amenable to some suits in tort; Con-
gress could not have intended to impose liability for the regulatory
enforcement activities of the FAA challenged in this case. The FAA
has a statutory duty to promote safety in air transportation, not to in-
sure it. We hold that these actions against the FAA for its alleged
negligence in certificating aircraft for use in commercial aviation are
barred by the discretionary function exception of the [FTCA].
Id.
79 221 F.2d 62 (D.C. Cir.), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Union Trust Co., 350
U.S. 907 (1955).
- 12 J. MOORE, H. BENDIX & B. RINGLE, MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE § 400.05-
1, p. 4-25 (2d ed. 1988). "In sum, dismissals of appeals from state court for want
of a substantial federal question and summary affirmances of lower federal court
judgments for like reasons are decisions on the merits, and are binding on lower
courts .... . Id.
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tional Airport in Washington, D.C. 8 The plaintiffs al-
leged, among other acts of negligence, that the tower
personnel negligently cleared two aircraft to land on the
same runway at the same time.8 2 The United States ar-
gued that neither the tower operators nor the United
States could be held liable because their duties involved
the exercise of discretion.8 3
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia re-
viewed both the Dalehite and Indian Towing decisions and
the duties required of air traffic control tower personnel.84
The court held that while tower operators were in a sense
exercising discretion, they were not performing the type
of discretionary function covered by section 2680(a).85 As
a result of this decision, the United States has been held
liable for the negligent acts of air traffic controllers in nu-
merous cases.
86
"' Eastern Airlines, 221 F.2d at 64.
,w Id. at 78-77. In addition to this act of affirmative negligence, three acts of
negligent omission were alleged including: (1) failure of the control tower person-
nel to issue a timely warning to the Eastern plane as to the P-38 being on final
approach; (2) failure to warn the P-38 that Eastern was on final approach; and (3)
failure to keep both planes advised of the activities of the other. Id.
,- Id. at 74-77. The government argued that "the tower operators' duties are
public in nature and involve the exercise of discretion and judgment, with the
result that neither the operators nor the United States can be held liable for their
negligent performance." Id.
4 Id. at 78.
- Id. The court held that "[t]he tower operators acted, and failed to act, at an
operational level. While they were in a sense exercising discretion as to what they
should and should not do, they were not performing the sort of discretionary
function contemplated by section 2680(a) and clearly described in the Dalehite
decision." Id.
m; See, e.g., Brooks v. United States, 695 F.2d 984 (5th Cir. 1983) (United States
liable for air traffic controller's negligence in failing to provide pilot with Notices
to Airmen report); Hartz v. United States, 387 F.2d 870 (5th Cir. 1968) (failure of
air traffic controller to report facts material to the safe operation of aircraft could
give rise to liability); United States v. Furumizo, 381 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1967)
(United States liable for negligence of air traffic controller who cleared a private
plane for take offin the wake of a large commercial transport); Ingrahm v. Eastern
Air Lines, Inc., 373 F.2d 227 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 931 (1967) (govern-
ment held liable for air traffic controller's failure to accurately report current and
changing weather conditions); United Air Lines, Inc. v. Wiener, 335 F.2d 379 (9th
Cir.), cert. dismissed, 379 U.S. 951 (1964) (violation of air traffic control rules by
controller resulted in government liability under the FTCA).
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THE CONFLICT CREATED By THE SUPREME COURT IN
VARIG
The language and timing of the prior United States
Supreme Court decisions on the discretionary function
exceptions are interestingly symmetrical. In Dalehite, the
Supreme Court, using broad language, left the legal pro-
fession uncertain as to just what boundaries existed in ap-
plying the discretionary function exception and the
"planning level" vs. "operational level" test." It seemed
logical to conclude that if Congress had meant to exempt
all regulatory activity from tort liability they would have
said so in the FTCA. Yet, given the facts of Dalehite and
the broad language of the Supreme Court,88 arguably the
acts of all decision-making employees of regulatory agen-
cies could fall-within the exception. In the regulatory en-
vironment it is nearly impossible to escape discretion at
any decision-making level, regardless of how "opera-
tional" it may be. Additionally, under the reasoning of
Dalehite the discretionary function exception for planning-
level activities also seems to apply to the conduct of all
employees carrying out the decision. 89
A little over two years after Dalehite, the Supreme Court
found it necessary to revisit the discretionary function ex-
ception in Indian Towing.90 For some reason, even though
the government conceded that the conduct in question in
Indian Towing was at the "operational-level", the Supreme
Court felt compelled to discuss the discretionary function
exception and put some limit on the extent of conduct to
which it would apply.9 ' Essentially, the Supreme Court
"7 See supra notes 24-40 and accompanying text for a discussion of Dalehite.
- Dalehite, 346 U.S. at 36. The Court stated: "Where there is room for policy
judgment and decision there is discretion. It necessarily follows that acts of sub-
ordinates in carrying out the operations of government in accordance with official
directions cannot be actionable". Id.
":, Id. The Court stated that "[i]f it were not so, the protection of § 2680(a)
would fail at the time it would be needed, that is, when a subordinate performs or
fails to perform a causal step .... Id.
1m, 350 U.S. 61 (1955); see supra notes 41-56 and accompanying text for a discus-
sion of Indian Towing.
1, Indian Towing, 350 U.S. at 69.
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stated that it was an exercise of discretion for the Coast
Guard to undertake the lighthouse service; however, if the
Coast Guard was negligent in carrying out that service,
the government would be held liable.9 2 The conduct of
mislabeling fertilizer bags in Dalehite and the failure to
properly maintain a lighthouse in Indian Towing appear to
be similar types of conduct. Within a few short years,
however, the Supreme Court reached a different conclu-
sion regarding the government's liability for negligent
performance of a regulatory agency's employee(s).93
The lower courts wrestled with this distinction for
nearly thirty years before the Supreme Court undertook
another review of the discretionary function exception.94
In Varig, as previously discussed, the Supreme Court thor-
oughly reviewed the history of the discretionary function
exception. 95 The Court dismissed the Indian Towing ra-
tionale as inapplicable and resurrected Dalehite.96 The
Court's rambling language, however, created a vague
standard for the determination of what would be pro-
tected discretionary conduct and what conduct would re-
sult in governmental liability. The Supreme Court
indicated that it was the nature of the conduct which gov-
erned the application of the discretionary function excep-
tion.97 The "nature" could be established by determining
whether the challenged acts were of the "nature and qual-
102 Id.
w, Id. In Dalehite, the Court disposed of the plaintiffs' claim of negligent fire
fighting, holding that "there is no analogous liability" in tort law. 346 U.S. at 44.
Varig, 467 U.S. at 797.
See supra notes 57-78 and accompanying text for a discussion of Varig.
Varig, 467 U.S. at 812-13, 814 n.12.
,,7 The Court stated:
[I]t is the nature of the conduct, rather than the status of the actor,
that governs whether the discretionary function exception applies in
a given case. As the Court pointed out in Dalehite, the exception cov-
ers '[n]ot only agencies of government.., but all employers exercis-
ing discretion.' Thus, the basic inquiry concerning the application
of the discretionary function excepton is whether the challenged acts
of a Government employee - whatever his or her rank - are of the
nature and quality that Congress intended to shield from tort
liability.
Id. at 813 (citation omitted).
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ity" that Congress intended to shield from tort liability. 8
The Supreme Court then provided two separate and
somewhat contradictory tests for determining what acts
Congress intended to shield. The Court first indicated, in
very broad language, that the discretionary function
plainly was intended to encompass discretionary acts of
the government when regulating the conduct of private
individuals.9 9 The Court noted that Congress seemed to
emphasize protection for regulatory activities by includ-
ing the discretionary function exception within the
FTCA. 00
Within the same discussion, the Supreme Court then
implied that the nature of the conduct that Congress in-
tended to shield could be determined by the type of deci-
sion that was made.'' Under the Court's rationale, one
could determine whether the discretionary function ex-
ception applies to a particular decision if that decision was
grounded in "social, economic, and political policy.' 1 ° 2 If
the answer to this narrower test was yes, then the Court
determined that Congress wished to prevent judicial "sec-
I" d.
* Id. at 813-14. The Court held:
[W]hatever else the discretionary function exception may include, it
plainly was intended to encompass the discretionary acts of the Gov-
ernment acting in its role as a regulator of the conduct of private
individuals. Time and again the legislative history refers to the acts
of regulatory agencies as examples of those covered by the excep-
tion, and it is significant that the early tort claims bills considered by
Congress specifically exempted two major regulatory agencies by
name.
Id. (citation and footnote omitted).
loo Id. at 814.
... Id. The Court stated:
[The] emphasis upon protection for regulatory activities suggests an
underlying basis for the inclusion of an exception for discretionary
functions in the Act: Congress wished to prevent judicial "second-
guessing" of legislative and administrative decisions grounded in so-
cial, economic, and political policy through the medium of an action
in tort. By fashioning an exception for discretionary governmental
functions, including regulatory activities, Congress took "steps to
protect the Government from liability that would seriously handicap
efficient government operations."
Id. (quoting United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150, 163 (1963)).
102 Id.
7731989]
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ond-guessing" of these types of legislative and adminis-
trative decisions through the medium of a tort action. 0 3 It
is not surprising, given the goals of conflicting litigants,
that these two seemingly contradictory standards would
be pitted against each other in arguments across the
country.
The government took the position that Varig stood for
blanket immunity for all regulatory activities of regulatory
agencies. 104 Plaintiff's lawyers, on the other hand, argued
that if the decisions of the government employees were
not grounded in social, economic and political policy,
then the discretionary function exception did not apply.
This resulted in contradictory and confusing decisions
throughout the Courts of Appeals.
In the four years following the decision, Varig was cited
in 207 cases in the lower federal courts. It was only a mat-
ter of time before the divergent positions taken by the
government lawyers and by the plaintiffs' bar created a
conflict among the circuits which would warrant the
Supreme Court's review of the Varig decision. This con-
flict arose most clearly in cases involving polio vaccines
regulated by the Food and Drug Administration. 10 5
THE POLIO CASES
Griffin v. United States
The series of polio cases began ten years prior to the
Vaig decision with Griffin v. United States. 106 In Griffin, the
plaintiffs sought to recover damages from the United
I d.
See Dillman, The Impact Of Berkovitz On Varig, presented at the Litigation in
Aviation Seminar by the Section of Tort and Insurance Practice of the American
Bar Association (Oct. 27, 28, 1988). Dillman states that "[p]erhaps the one thing
that is clear from Berkovitz is that the Government can no longer assert that Varig
provides a blanket protection for all regulatory activities of all regulatory agen-
cies." Id.
11' Berkovitz v. United States, 108 S.Ct. 1954 (1988). The Court granted certi-
orari "to resolve a conflict in the Circuits regarding the effect of the discretionary
function exception on claims arising from the Government's regulation of polio
vaccines." Id. at 1958.
1- 500 F.2d 1059 (3d Cir. 1974).
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States for injuries sustained allegedly as a result of inges-
tion of a Sabin oral, live-virus polio vaccine.10 7 The gov-
ernment appealed an adverse judgment by the district
court challenging the court's failure to bar the claim
under the discretionary function exception.'0 8 The Third
Circuit acknowledged that the plaintiffs were only chal-
lenging the manner of implementation of the regulation
and not the decision to regulate.' °9 The plaintiffs con-
tended that, in approving a particular lot of vaccine for
release to the public, the Department of Biological Stan-
dards ("DBS") failed to comply with the standards estab-
lished by the Surgeon General." l0
The court then analyzed the decision of DBS and deter-
mined that its "judgment . . .was that of a professional
107 Id. at 1061. Mary Jane Griffin participated in a vaccination program spon-
sored by the Montgomery County Medical Society. After developing polio as a
result of the vaccination, she brought suit against the Medical Society, Charles
Pfizer & Co., and the United States. Mrs. Griffin settled with Pfizers' Co. and
dismissed the actions against the Medical Society. Id. at 1062.
,,8 Id. The government also appealed the district court's findings of negligence
and proximate cause, the damages awarded, and the district court's refusal to en-
force a joint tortfeasor release in the settlement between the Griffins and Charles
Pfizer & Co. Id. The government lost all these appeals except for the last, which
was remanded to the district court. Id. at 1069-73.
o Id. at 1064. The court explained:
[A]t the outset, we emphasize what is not being challenged on this
appeal. Plaintiffs do no challenge the Surgeon General's determina-
tion to approve a live-virus immunization program. Neither do
plaintiffs challenge the regulation which established the standard
against which all manufactured lots were to be measured. These
were matters involving balancing of policy considerations in advanc-
ing the public interest. Plaintiffs, in the instant case, challenge solely
the manner by which the regulation was implemented.
Id. (citation omitted).
,,o Id. The court stated:
The regulation enumerates five criteria as evidence of nonvirulence:
the number of animals showing lesions characteristic of poliovirus
infection, the number of animals showing lesions other than those
characteristic of poliovirus infection, the severity of the lesions, the
degree of dissemination of the lesions, and the rate of occurrence of
paralysis not attributable to the mechanical injury resulting from in-
oculation trauma.
Id. at 1065 (footnote omitted). The court ruled that the scientists had to make a
comparative analysis of the five criteria, with no one criteria being dispositive, to
decide if the neurovirulence of each particular lot exceeded a reference standard.
Id. at 1065-68.
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measuring neurovirulence.""' Applying its analysis to
the language of Dalehite, the court determined that this
type ofjudgment "was not that of a policy-maker promul-
gating regulations by balancing competing policy consid-
erations in determining the public interest."'"1 2  In the
court's view, at issue was a scientific determination, not a
policy-making determination."13 The court concluded by
holding that the government may be liable where its em-
ployees fail to comply to statutory and regulatory
requirements. " 14
Loge v. United States
In another pre-Varig decision, the Eighth Circuit Court
of Appeals in Loge v. United States "1- addressed the issue of
whether the government could be liable for negligent fail-
ure to conduct mandatory tests as required by the depart-
mental regulations."16 In addition, the court considered
whether the negligent failure to conduct mandatory tests
for a subsequently approved specific polio vaccine lot
could serve as a basis for liability." 7 In Loge, the plaintiff
had contracted paralytic polio after contact with her infant
son who was innoculated with a trivalent, live poliovirus
vaccine known as Orimune. t" 8
1 Id. at 1066. The court stated: "We acknowledge that under DBS' construc-
tion of the regulation, the implementation called for a judgmental determination
as to the degree to which each of the enumerated criteria indicated
neurovirulence in monkeys. The judgment, however, was that of a professional
measuring neurovirulence." Id.
,,2 Id. The court further stated: "Neither was it a policy planning decision nor a
determination of the feasibility or practicability of a government program." Id.
". Id. The court noted that the government is not shielded by the discretion-
ary function when the government official's activity "exceeds the authority con-
ferred." Id. at 1069. In those instances, "[l]iability ... is predicated not on a
negligent or unwise policy determination, but on the failure of Government em-
ployees to conform to and act consistently with the authority delegated." Id.
,,4 Id. The court held that, "[t]he Government may be liable where its employ-
ees, in carrying out their duties, failed to conform to pre-existing statutory and
regulatory requirements." Id.
,, 662 F.2d 1268 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 944 (1982).
Id. at 1271-73.
117 Id.
11" Id. at 1269.
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The Eighth Circuit reviewed the regulations under
which the government approved and distributed the polio
vaccine, as well as the case law under the discretionary
function exception." 9 The court noted that the Secretary
of the Health, Education and Welfare (HEW), which at
the time had authority over polio vaccination testing, did
not have discretion to disregard the mandatory regulatory
commands regarding licensing requirements prior to
manufacture, or regarding the release of particular lot for
distribution to the public.' 20 The court went on to affirm
the district court's order of dismissal, but reversed and re-
manded the district court's dismissal of the plaintiffs'
claims alleging liability based on the government's viola-
tion of the regulations. ' 2
Baker v. United States
The issue of whether a regulatory agency could be held
liable for the distribution of a polio vaccine next arose in
Baker v. United States.' 22 The plaintiff in this case con-
tracted polio after his nephew was innoculated with a tri-
valent, live, oral poliovirus vaccine. 23 The plaintiff
brought an action against the United States under the
FTCA alleging that the HEW negligently failed to require
the mandatory testing prior to issuing a license allowing
the laboratory to manufacture and distribute the vac-
cine. 24 The district court dismissed the action for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction because the action was barred
by the discretionary function exception. 2 5
The Ninth Circuit focused its inquiry on whether Con-
gress intended to shield from tort liability the govern-
, Id. at 1270-73.
12 Id. at 1273. The court stated that HEW had "no discretion to disregard the
mandatory regulatory commands pertaining to criteria a vaccine must meet before
licensing its manufacture, or releasing a particular lot of vaccine for distribution
to the public." Id. (citing Griffin, 500 F.2d at 1063-9).
"21 Id. at 1275.
122 817 F.2d 560 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2845 (1988).
12-1 Id. at 561.
124 Id. at 561-62.
12 Id. at 561.
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ment's failure to follow its own regulations. 26 The Ninth
Circuit cited Dalehite, Varig and numerous Ninth Circuit
decisions since Varig,' 27 but noted that none of these cases
had addressed the precise issue of "whether a govern-
mental agency, when regulating the conduct of private individu-
als, may be subject to tort liability for the alleged
negligence of an agency employee in failing to follow a
specific mandatory regulation."'' 28 The court recognized
that this issue posed a close and difficult question. 2 9
The Ninth Circuit summarized its view of the discre-
tionary function exception and recognized inclusion of a
government agency's failure to follow its own regulatory
commands would not extend the exception too far.' 30
The government argued that the Supreme Court's opin-
121; Id. at 563. The court focused on whether the "government's alleged failure
to follow its own regulatory commands is the type of decision Congress intended
to shield from tort liability in order to preserve a zone within which choice by
governmental personnel can be exercised without threat of suit under the FTCA."
Id.
.7 Id. at 564; see Mitchell v. United States, 787 F.2d 466 (9th Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 108 S. Ct. 163 (1987) (agency's decision to rely on FAA recommendations
to not mark ground wires protected by discretionary function exception); Cun-
ningham v. United States, 786 F.2d 1445 (9th Cir. 1986) (OSHA decisions and
inspections concerning plant safety standards protected); Baie v. Secretary of De-
fense, 784 F.2d 1375 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 823 (1986) (decision inter-
preting regulations governing medical benefits for retired military personnel falls
within exception); Proctor v. United States, 781 F.2d 752 (9th Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 476 U.S. 1183 (1986) (FAA's alleged negligent conduct in certifying air-
craft by actual inspection of discrete parts of aircraft falls within exception);
Chamberlin v. Isen, 779 F.2d 522 (9th Cir. 1985) (patent examiner's conduct in
rejecting a patent application protected); Begay v. United States, 768 F.2d 1059
(9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1110 (1988) (decision of Public Health Ser-
vice not to warn miners of radiation dangers they were exposed to was clearly
within ambit of the exception); Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of Am. v. United States,
742 F.2d 502 (9th Cir. 1984) (alleged FAA negligence in conducting actual in-
spections for certification within the exception).
12, Baker, 817 F.2d at 564 (emphasis added).
121, Id.
'1" Id. The court stated:
The discretionary function exception shelters actions taken on the
basis of erroneous facts, the failure to exercise available discretion in
any way, the failure to perform supervisorial tasks, and the failure to
enforce effectively regulatory orders. It would not extend this ex-
ception greatly to include within it the facts of this case.
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ion in Varig undercut prior decisions in Loge and Griffin
and that whenever a tort action was based upon regula-
tory inspection and enforcement activities, the discretion-
ary function exception barred such claims against the
government. 13 ' The Ninth Circuit declined to go that
far, 13 2 holding that when the plaintiff alleges that a gov-
ernmental employee negligently failed to obey a
mandatory regulatory command, the discretionary func-
tion exception to the FTCA does not insulate the govern-
ment from liability. 33
Berkovitz by Berkovitz v. United States
A conflict between the circuits arose when, faced with a
similar fact situation, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals
refused to follow its precedent and the reasoning of the
Eighth and Ninth Circuits. In Berkovitz by Berkovitz v.
United States 13 the court again faced a case where an indi-
vidual contracted polio as a result of taking a live polio
vaccine. 135 The question before the court, on interlocu-
tory appeal, was whether its holding in Griffin v. United
States 136 remained binding following the Supreme Court's
pronouncement in Varig on the scope of the discretionary
function exception. 137 The court acknowledged that the
Berkovitzs' complaint alleged violations of regulations
identical to those at issue in Griffin.13 8
The government asked the court to interpret Varig
broadly to mean that the discretionary function exception
' Id. at 565.
''-4 Id. The court cited to Collins v. United States, 783 F.2d 1225, 1231 (5th Cir.
1986), which held that the allegedly negligent acts of government employees in
terminating an imminent danger order for a salt mine and failing to reclassify the
mine as grassy, thereby permitting the mine to remain open, did not fall within
the discretionary function exception. Baker, 817 F.2d at 565.
1.3 Id. at 566.
'4 822 F.2d 1322 (3d Cir. 1987), rev'd, 108 S. Ct. 1954 (1988).
Berkovitz by Berkovitz, 822 F.2d at 1323-24.
" See supra notes 106-114 and accompanying text for a discussion of Griffin.
147 See supra notes 57-78 and accompanying text for a discussion of Varig.
1- Berkovitz by Berkovitz, 822 F.2d at 1325. Griffin, like Berkovitz, contracted
polio pursuant to the injection of a polio vaccine. Id.
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applies to all claims arising from the regulatory activities
of the government.' 3 9 The government relied on the lan-
guage in Varig that the discretionary acts of the govern-
ment "acting in its role as a regulator of the conduct of
private individuals"'' 40 are within the discretionary func-
tion exception.' 4 ' The court rejected this per se rule and
instead agreed with the Fifth Circuit's decision in Col-
lins.' 4 2 The court construed Vanig as requiring the courts
to distinguish between regulatory actions which are dis-
cretionary and those which are non-discretionary. 43 In
addressing the Berkovitzs' contentions that the alleged
negligent acts or omissions were in violation of non-dis-
cretionary duties, the Third Circuit developed three cate-
gories of conduct which it determined fell within the
discretionary function exception. 44
The court then analogized the Food and Drug Adminis-
tration's (FDA) duties to those of the FAA's which the
Supreme Court addressed in Vanig. 45 The Berkovitzs' ar-
gued that the FDA had no discretion to license or release
vaccines which it knew did not comply with FDA regula-
1.- Id. at 1327 (citing the government's brief at 18).
14o The Supreme Court in Varig stated: "Whatever else the discretionary func-
tion exception may include it plainly was intended to encompass the discretionary
acts of the Government acting in its role as a regulator of the conduct of private
individuals." 467 U.S. at 813-14.
14, Berkovitz by Berkovitz, 822 F.2d at 1327.
142 Collins v. United States, 783 F.2d 1225 (5th Cir. 1986).
14., Berkovitz by Berkovitz, 822 F.2d at 1329. The court stated: "We therefore con-
strue Varig as requiring the courts to distinguish between those FTCA suits based
on regulatory actions which are discretionary, and which therefore cannot be
maintained, and those based on alleged negligence in the performance of a non-
discretionary regulatory action." Id.
144 Id. The court stated:
After Varig, it is clear that the discretionary function exception ex-
empts the United States from claims based on l)discretionary plan-
ning level acts and omissions, 2)discretionary operational level acts
and omissions, and 3)non-discretionary operational level acts and
omissions taken in furtherance of planning level discretionary
decisions.
Id. (citations omitted).
14. Id. at 1330-31. The court stated: "However, the FDA's statutory duty is not
different in substance from the duty that the Supreme Court in Varig found rests
with the FAA." Id. at 1330.
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tions. 14 6 However, the court concluded that this was sim-
ply a negligence argument.' 47 The court concluded that
the FDA's discretionary decision to examine or test sam-
ples could not lead to subsequent governmental liability
for negligence in implementing the decision. 48 The
court reversed the district court's order denying the gov-
ernment's motion for summary judgment and remanded
with instructions that the district court grant the govern-
ment's motion. 149
TREATMENT OF BERKOVITZ BY THE SUPREME COURT
On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court re-
versed the Third Circuit and held in a unanimous opinion
that the discretionary function exception precludes liabil-
ity only when governmental conduct involves the permis-
sible exercise of policy judgment.' 50 Just as the Court
used the decision of Indian Towing to retreat from the
broad holding of Dalehite, it now used Berkovitz, a mere
four years after Varig, to retreat from the broad holding of
Vaig and the position the government espoused from that
holding.
The Supreme Court began its analysis with a review of
the discretionary function exception and the decisions of
Vang and Dalehite.'5' The Court reiterated that the discre-
,46 Id. at 1331. The court stated that "Berkovitz argues that once the FDA had
information that the vaccine did not comply with the regulations, it had no discre-
tion to approve either the license for production or the lot for release." Id.
,.7 Id. The court concluded that, "[o]n examination, however, this argument is
simply that the FDA acted negligently." Id.
,48 Id. at 1332. The court concluded that:
It follows that when the FDA makes the discretionary choice to ex-
amine or test samples which it has discretion not to test, it cannot be
held liable for subsequent negligence at the operational level in im-
plementing its decision to test.
ld.
,49 Id. The Supreme Court subsequently reversed this decision in Berkovitz v.
United States, 108 S. Ct. 1954 (1988).
1-5o Berkovitz v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 1954 (1988). The Supreme Court
stated that "[tihe discretionary function exception applies only to conduct that in-
volves the permissible exercise of policy judgment." Id. at 1960 (emphasis
added).
151 Id. at 1958-60.
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tionary function exception shows the division between the
conflicting legislative desire of imposing some tort liabil-
ity on the federal government while at the same time insu-
lating certain governmental functions from liability. 52
The Court then reviewed each of its enunciations on the
application of the discretionary function exception in
Vang and applied limiting explanations to each one.15 3
The Court, quoting Vang, stated:
'It is the nature of the conduct, rather than the status of
the actor, that governs whether the discretionary function
exception applies in a given case (citation omitted).' In
examining the nature of the challenged conduct, a court
must first consider whether the action is a matter of choice for the
acting employee. This inquiry is mandated by the language
of the exception; conduct cannot be discretionary unless it
involves an element ofjudgment or choice (citation omit-
ted). Thus, the discretionary function exception will not
apply when a federal statute, regulation orpolicy specifically
prescribes a course of action for an employee to follow.' 54
The Court then reasserted its position that the employee's
exercise of choice or judgment is determinative of the ap-
plicability of the discretionary function exception. 55
The Court did not end its analysis of the application of
the discretionary function exception there. Instead, the
Court went on to address the issue of challenged conduct
that involves an element of judgment. 56 The Court be-
gan its analysis by commenting that just because judg-
ment is involved it does not necessarily follow that the
1.I2 ld. at 1958. The Court, citing Varig, stated that the exception "marks the
boundary between Congress' willingness to impose tort liability upon the United
States and its desire to protect certain governmental activities from exposure to
suit by private individuals." Id. (citation omitted).
Id. at 1958-60.
, Id. at 1958 (emphasis added).
Id. at 1959. The Court stated that "if the employee's conduct cannot appro-
priately be the product ofjudgment or choice, then there is no discretion in the
conduct for the discretionary function exception to protect." Id. (citing Westfall
v. Erwin, 108 S. Ct. 580, 583 (1988) (recognizing that conduct cannot be discre-
tionary if prescribed by law)).
1-- Id.
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conduct is protected. 5 7 The Court stated that there must
be a determination of whether the judgment is of the kind
that Congress intended the discretionary function excep-
tion to shield. 58 Citing to the language in Varig that Con-
gress wished to prevent judicial "second guessing" of
decisions grounded in "social, economic, and political
policy," the Court held that the exception, when properly
construed, protects only governmental decisions which
are based on public policy considerations. 59
The Supreme Court explained that the holding in Varig
was based on the facts of the particular cases before them
at that time.' 60 The Court affirmed that the challenged
acts protected from liability in Vang were within the range
of choice afforded by federal policy and law, and were the
results of policy determinations. 16  Interestingly, the
Court breathed a new life into Indian Towing by noting the
distinction made in Indian Towing between conduct involv-
ing discretionary judgment and conduct outside permissi-
ble limits of policy judgment. 162
The Supreme Court then specifically addressed the
government's argument that the exception precluded lia-
bility for any and all acts arising out of the regulatory pro-
157 Id.
1,. Id.
'5 Id. The Court stated: "In sum, the discretionary function exception insu-
lates the Government from liability if the action challenged in the case involves
the permissible exercise of policy judgment." Id.
I,. Id.
161 Id.
1,;2 Id. at 1959 n.3. The Court stated:
The decision in Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 76 S.
Ct. 122, 100 L. Ed. 48 (1955), also illuminates the appropriate scope
of the discretionary function exception. The plaintiff in that case
sued the Government for failing to maintain a lighthouse in good
working order. The Court stated that the initial decision to under-
take and maintain lighthouse service was a discretionary judgment.
The Court held, however, that the failure to maintain the lighthouse
in good condition subjected the Government to suit under the
FTCA. The latter course of conduct did not involve any permissible
exercise of policy judgment.
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grams of federal agencies.' 63 The Court, in restating and
clarifying the scope of the discretionary function excep-
tion, specifically rejected the government's argument of
blanket immunity. 6 4 The Court explained that this ex-
ception did not cover all regulatory agency acts but only
those acts which are discretionary in nature. 65
The Supreme Court further resurrected Indian Towing
by noting that it had twice before rejected the govern-
ment's argument that all regulatory functions were im-
mune. 166 The Court then distinguished Varig by stating
that in Varig, the court ignored the precise argument the
government made in Berkovitz and instead focused on the
particular nature of the regulatory conduct at issue in
Varig.1 6 7 As if to make sure the message went out loud
and clear to the government, the Court reiterated: "To
the extent we have not already put the Government's ar-
gument to rest, we do so now. The discretionary function
exception applies only to conduct that involves the per-
missible exercise of policy judgment."'' 68
In addressing each of the Berkovitzs' claims, the Court
found that the discretionary function exception applied to
some of them but not to others. The Court summarized
the petitioners' claims as follows: first, that the DBS vio-
lated a federal statute and accompanying regulations
when it issued the license for the Lederle Laboratories for
the production of Orimune; 169 and second, that the Bu-
reau of Biologics of the FDA violated federal regulations
and policy when it approved the release of the particular
". Id. at 1959-60.
Id. at 1959. The Court stated: "That argument is rebutted first by the lan-
guage of the exception, which protects 'discretionary' functions rather than 'regu-
latory' functions." Id. at 1960 (citing Dalehite, 346 U.S. at 33-34).
"t Id. The Court held that the exception "was designed to cover not all acts of
regulatory agencies and their employees, but only such acts as are 'discretionary'
in nature." Id. (citing Dalehite, 346 U.S. at 33-34 and H.R. REP. No. 1287, 79th
Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1945)).
11 Id. (citing Rayonier, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 315, 318-19 (1957) and
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lot containing Kevan Berkovitz's dose. 70
The Court then made a significant statement that is im-
portant with respect to the timing of future government
motions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The Court
noted that because the decision it was reviewing was a
motion to dismiss, it (the Court) would accept all of the
factual allegations in the Berkovitzs' complaint as true in
order to determine whether, under the circumstances, it
would be appropriate to dismiss the complaint.' 71
After reviewing the statutory and regulatory provisions,
the Court determined that the DBS, prior to issuing a
product license, must receive all the data the manufactur-
ers are required to submit, examine the product and data
and then make a determination that the product complies
with the applicable safety standards. 72  In applying this
analysis to the Berkovitzs' allegation that the DBS issued a
license without receiving the appropriate data, the Court
held that:
The DBS has no discretion to issue a license without first
receiving the required test data; to do so would violate a
specific statutory and regulatory directive. Accordingly, to
the extent that petitioners' licensing claim is based on a
decision of the DBS to issue a license without having re-
ceived the required test data, the discretionary function
exception imposes no bar.17
3
170 Id. The Court did not address the applicability of the discretionary function
exception to a claim against the DBS for failure to revoke Lederle Laboratories'
license since petitioners did not raise this issue in their petition for writ of certio-
rari. Id. at 1960 n.6.
171 Id. at 1960-61. The Court specifically stated, "[blecause the decision we re-
view adjudicated a motion to dismiss, we accept all of the factual allegations in
petitioners' complaint as true and ask whether, in these circumstances, dismissal
of the complaint was appropriate." Id.
,72 Id. at 1961-62. Federal law requires a manufacturer of live oral polio vaccine
to receive a product license prior to marketing the product. In order to receive
this license the manufacturer must comply with several federal regulations. These
regulations require that the manufacturer make a sample of the vaccine and con-
duct safety tests at each manufacturing stage. The manufacturer, upon completing
the manufacturing and testing process, must submit a license application, the test
data, and the vaccine sample to the DBS. Id. at 1961.
I d. at 1962.
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The Court found the Berkovitzs' second allegation re-
garding the licensing of Orimune unclear. 74  If the
Berkovitzes alleged either (1) that the DBS licensed the
drug without determining whether the vaccine complied
with regulatory standards, or (2) that after determining
the vaccine failed to comply, the DBS then released the
vaccine, then the discretionary function exception did not
bar their claim.1 75 The Court held that the DBS had no
discretion to deviate from mandated statutory and regula-
tory procedures. 76
Whether the discretionary function exception applied
to the possible claim that the DBS incorrectly determined
that the drug complied with regulatory standards required
a different analysis. 77 The Court determined that the ap-
plicability of the discretionary function exception de-
pended on whether DBA officials "permissibly exercised
policy choice."'178 Finding that the parties did not address
this question in detail and did not provide the Court with
sufficient information with which to make a determina-
tion, the Court hesitated to decide that question.' 7 9 The
Court remanded the case to the district court for a deci-
sion of this issue, should the Berkovitzs' choose to press
174 Id. The Court noted that petitioners' charge could be read in three differ-
ent ways: (1) that the DBS licensed Orimune without a determination of compli-
ance with regulatory standards, (2) that the DBS found Orimune violated
regulatory standards but nonetheless issued a license, or (3) that the DBS deter-
mined compliance but erred in that determination. Id.
175 Id.
17, Id. at 1962-63. The Court stated: "When a suit charges an agency with fail-
ing to act in accord with a specific mandatory directive, the discretionary function
exception does not apply." Id. at 1963.
177 Id.
179 Id. The Court noted that the question turned on "whether the manner and
method of determining compliance with the safety standards at issue involves
agency judgment of the kind protected by the discretionary function exception."
Id. The Court further stated that "application of the discretionary function excep-
tion to the claim that the determination of compliance was incorrect hinges on
whether the agency officials making that determination permissibly exercised pol-
icy choice." Id.
179 Id. The Court stated that the parties had given the Court "no indication of
the way in which the DBS interprets and applies the regulations setting forth the
criteria for compliance." Id.
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that claim.' 80
The Court did find, however, that the regulatory
scheme governing the release of vaccine lots was substan-
tially similar to the regulatory scheme discussed in
Varig. '8 Under that analysis, the discretionary function
exception prohibits any challenges to the government's
policies regulating the release of vaccine lots.' 82 Again, in
an apparent attempt to limit a broad statement of law, the
Court commented:
[T]he discretionary function exception, however, does not
apply if the acts complained of do not involve the permis-
sible exercise of policy discretion. Thus, if the Bureau's
policy leaves no room for an official to exercise policy
judgment in performing a given act, or if the act simply
does not involve the exercise of such judgment, the discre-
tionary function exception does not bar a claim that the
act was negligent or wrongful. 181
When analyzed under these principles, the Berkovitzs'
claims against the government for the release of the vac-
cine lot from which Kevan Berkovitz received his dose
survived the government's motion to dismiss.'8 4
The Supreme Court correctly pointed out that it was
only the petitioners' complaint which alleged that the gov-
ernment's action did not involve an exercise of policy or
permitted discretion. 8 5 The Court stated, however, that:
Petitioners, of course, have not proved their factual allega-
tions, but they are not required to do so on a motion to dismiss. If
those allegations are correct... the discretionary function
exception does not bar the claim. Because petitioners may
yet show, on the basis of materials obtained in discovery or other-
wise, that the conduct challenged here did not involve the
-o Id.
is, Id. at 1964.
'1" Id. The Court stated "[t]he discretionary function exception bars any claims
that challenge the [government's] formulation of policy as to the appropriate way
in which to regulate the release of vaccine lots." Id.




788 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE [54
permissible exercise of policy discretion, the invocation of
the discretionary function exception to dismiss petition-
ers' lot release claim was improper. 86
The Court reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded
the case for further proceedings consistent with the
opinion. 187
WHERE Do WE Go FROM BERKOVITZ?
In its broadest sense, Berkovitz makes two things clear:
One, that Varig is still good law; and two, it was never
meant to immunize governmental conduct to the extent
that the government asserted after Varig. Berkovitz also al-
ters the timing and tactics to be considered by both the
plaintiff's bar and the government in asserting a federal
tort claim and the discretionary function exception.
The Court in Berkovitz stated that the discretionary func-
tion exception will not apply where there is a federal stat-
ute, regulation, or policy that prescribes the employee's
course of action.' This creates the ability to delay the
government's motion for dismissal for lack of jurisdiction
under the discretionary function exception until after rea-
sonable discovery has taken place. It also increases, how-
ever, the necessity for pre-litigation investigation and
carefully drafted pleadings. Rule 11 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure requires:
The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certifi-
cate by the signer that the signer has read the pleading,
motion, or other paper; that to the best of signer's knowl-
edge, information and belief formed after reasonable in-
quiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by
existing law or a good faith argument for the extension,
modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not
interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or
to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost
Id. (citation omitted ) (emphasis added).
187 Id.
-H Id. at 1958.
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of litigation .... 9
Rule 11, in essence, prohibits an attorney from filing a
complaint alleging the violation of a federal statute, regu-
lation or policy that specifically prescribes a course of con-
duct for government employees in the hopes of proving
such allegation later through discovery. In order to have
some good faith basis for this type of allegation, early in-
vestigation of the case, including a Freedom of Informa-
tion Act request of the governmental agencies involved
will be necessary. The request will have to be drafted so
as to include disclosure of any agency policy or policies
that might affect the conduct thought to give rise to
liability.
Once the plaintiff's attorney believes that there is a
good faith basis to make an allegation of a violation of a
specifically-directed statute, regulation or policy, then the
attorney must clearly set forth in the pleadings the con-
duct and violation in order to defeat an early motion by
the government for dismissal for lack of subject matter ju-
risdiction. As the Supreme Court pointed out in Berkovitz,
a court is required to accept all of the factual allegations
in the complaint as true and ask whether, under those cir-
cumstances, dismissal of the complaint is appropriate. 90
Prior to Berkovitz, plaintiff's attorneys had to assess the
strengths and merits of an FTCA case with the view that
more likely than not, as a matter of law, the government
would be immune. That issue, however, would usually be
decided early in the case without high cost and years of
effort. Likewise, the government was reasonably success-
ful in shielding much of its conduct from review by dis-
covery by filing early motions for dismissal. After Berkovitz
the risk and expense for both sides has increased.
From the plaintiff's perspective there is an increased
duty and cost to thoroughly investigate governmental
statutes, regulations and policies in assessing the merits of a
1"8' FED. R. CIV. PROC. 11.
's' Berkovitz, 108 S. Ct. at 1961.
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tort claim. Prior to Berkovitz, the statutes and published
regulations involved were usually available. Prior deci-
sions, however, had held that an agency's policies did not
create a duty to the public and were not to be considered
in reviewing a government employee's conduct.1 9 ' Even
though a Freedom of Information Act request is not very
costly or time consuming, the material produced as a re-
sult of it could be voluminous. This effort, however, only
gets the plaintiff to the stage of being able to file a proper
complaint within Rule 11; the development of the facts
and evidence necessary to prove the case at its conclusion
will probably require additional discovery.
Likewise, a review of internal policies now exposes the
government to greater risk that its conduct will be the ba-
sis of liability. Having written policies for years with the
view that they were not a basis for potential liability,
agency administrators did not have to allow for discretion.
The number of governmental policies, such as those
found in Berkovitz, that have been written with mandatory
directives remains to be seen in future cases.
With regard to the FAA, one need only return to the
United Scottish case which was combined with the Varig de-
cision. The United Scottish case involved the crash of a
DeHaviland Dove aircraft on October 8, 1968.192 Shortly
after taking off from Las Vegas, Nevada the aircraft caught
fire, crashed and burned, killing all four people aboard. 9 3
The FAA issued a supplemental-type certificate for a
modification to the heater system in the nose of the air-
craft.' 94 Since only two aircraft were involved, the regula-
tions permitted less pre-installation documentation,
provided that the FAA inspector examine and approve the
-, See, e.g., Clemente v. United States, 567 F.2d 1140, 1144-45 (1st Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1006 (1978) (stating that the "duty to comply with the direc-
tives of their superiors is owed by the employees to the government and is totally
distinguishable from a duty owed by the government to the public on which liabil-
ity could be based").
-2 Varig, 467 U.S. at 802.
1,' Id.
19 Id.
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completed installation before the supplemental-type cer-
tificate was issued. 19
5
An actual inspection of the installation by an FAA in-
spector was mandatory for certification because the only
previous specifications provided to the FAA were Polaroid
pictures of the completed installation. 196 The district
court found that the heater, as installed, exhibited numer-
ous design deficiencies, which should have alerted any
reasonable competent FAA or general aviation district of-
fice inspector to the fact that the overall quality of the de-
sign and fabrication of the heater system was inconsistent
with FAA regulations.'9 7 The trial court also found that
the accident would not have occurred if a non-negligent,
proper inspection had been made. 19 8After Berkovitz it is
unlikely that this case would not result in liability on be-
half of the government.
More recently, the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of New York held that a negligent medical
examination of a pilot by an aviation medical examiner
gives rise to liability on behalf of the United States. 99
That Berkovitz was a necessary and important case in as-
sisting lower courts on the boundaries of the discretionary
function exception is evidenced by its citation in 23 cases
within five months after the decision was handed down. 00
11m FAA, ORDER TYPE CERTIFICATION MANUAL 31-32 (1967) (requiring a physi-
cal inspection of the "prototype modification" if compliance cannot be deter-
mined adequately from the evaluation of the technical data).
ux Joint Appendix at 281-83, Varig, 467 U.S. at 797 (deposition of Charles H.
McMillan, Assistant Chief, Engineering-Manufacturing Branch, FAA, Ft. Worth,
Texas; Mr. McMillan signed the supplemental-type certificate for the Dove after-
modification).
197 Id. at 209 (transcript of Finding of Fact No. 21, United Scottish Ins. Co. v.
United States, Civ. No. 71-36-E (S.D. Cal. July 30, 1975)).
ms Id. at 210 (transcript of Finding of Fact No. 27, United Scottish, Civ. No. 71-
36-E (S.D. Cal. July 30, 1975)).
,-3J Leone v. United States, 690 F. Supp. 1182, 1190-91 (E.D.N.Y. 1988).
2- See, e.g., Doe v. Stephens, 851 F.2d 1457 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (failure of plaintiff
to cite a governmental regulation which prohibits the otherwise discretionary con-
duct of the United States Attorney in issuing a subpoena supported District
Court's dismissal of plaintiff's claim as within the discretionary function excep-
tion); Wells v. United States, 851 F.2d 1471 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (alleged negligent
decision of Environmental Protection Agency administrator to conduct further
1989]
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CONCLUSION
As litigants for both sides learn to craft the words of
Berkovitz to each particular case before the lower courts,
we can expect to see the lower courts continue to struggle
with exactly where the discretionary function exception
lies. Under the reasoning of Berkovitz, however, we should
definitely see more cases in which the government is held
liable for the conduct of its employees. If history holds
true to course, it will be twenty-eight to thirty years before
the Supreme Court hands down another leading decision
on the discretionary function exception. Until then, the
burden is on plaintiff's attorneys to carefully read the lan-
guage of Berkovitz and capture the Phoenix as it arises
from the ashes of Varig.
study while refusing to take immediate action with respect to lead pollution in an
area surrounding smelters, came within the discretionary function exception of
the FTCA, notwithstanding contention by residents of neighborhoods near smelt-
ers that administrator's decision was based only upon scientific considerations;
the court found that the administrator's decision was also based upon social, eco-
nomic and political policy considerations); Mercado Del Valle v. United States,
856 F.2d 406 (1st Cir. 1988) (plaintiff's failure to point to any specific factual
information. to rebut inference that supervision of ROTC recruits was discretion-
ary rather than mandatory warrants dismissal under the discretionary function ex-
ception); Patterson v. United States, 856 F.2d 670, 674 (4th Cir. 1988) (Office of
Surface Mining field investigators are not authorized to exercise discretion in
making policy judgment, therefore the discretionary function exception is not ap-
plicable to an allegedly negligent inspection of a fire at a coal refuse pile); McMi-
chael v. United States, 856 F.2d 1026 (8th Cir. 1988) (consolidated cases were
filed against the United States under the FTCA seeking to recover for death and
injuries resulting by explosion at a munitions plant. In the case before the Eighth
Circuit, the initial discretion granted by the regulation to the Department of De-
fense was broad; however, the inspectors violated the Department's own policy
directives by failing to comply with specific procedures mandated by the Defense
Department. Hence, the discretionary function exception was not applicable);
Jurzec v. American Motors Corp., 856 F.2d 1116 (8th Cir. 1988) (decision
whether or not to issue safety warnings regarding the resale of United States Pos-
tal Service jeeps with an alleged rollover tendency was immune under the discre-
tionary function exception as well as the decision that once a safety warning is
dictated, the matters of particular language, color and size of the warning are also
within the discretion of the Postal Service); Gleason v. United States ex rel Army
Corps of Eng'rs, 857 F.2d 1208 (8th Cir. 1988) (United States Army Corps of
Engineers participation in the approval of the design of a bridge falls within the
planning-level process, and is accordingly immune under the discretionary func-
tion exception).
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